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ABSTRACT
Despite the ambitious temperature goal of the 2015 Paris Agreement, the pace of
reducing global CO2 emissions remains sluggish. This creates conditions in which the
idea of temperature ‘overshoot and peak-shaving’ is emerging as a possible strategy
to meet the Paris goal. An overshoot and peak-shaving scenario rests upon the
‘temporary’ use of speculative solar radiation management (SRM) technologies
combined with large-scale carbon dioxide removal (CDR). Whilst some view
optimistically the strategic interdependence between SRM and CDR, we argue that
this strategy comes with a risk of escalating ‘climate debt’. We explain our position
using the logic of debt and the analogy of subprime mortgage lending. In overshoot
and peak-shaving scenarios, the role of CDR and SRM is to compensate for delayed
mitigation, placing the world in a double debt: ‘emissions debt’ and ‘temperature
debt’. Analogously, this can be understood as a combination of ‘subprime mortgage’
(i.e. large-scale CDR) and ‘home-equity-line-of-credit’ (i.e. temporary SRM). With this
analogy, we draw some important lessons from the 2007–2009 US subprime
mortgage crisis. The analogy signals that the eﬃcacy of temporary SRM cannot be
evaluated in isolation of the feasibility of large-scale CDR and that the failure of the
overshoot promise will lead to prolonged peak-shaving, masking an ever-rising
climate debt. Overshoot and peak-shaving scenarios should not be presented as a
secured feasible investment, but rather as a high-risk speculation betting on insecure
promises. Obscuring the riskiness of such scenarios is a precipitous step towards
escalating a climate debt crisis.
Key policy insights
. The slow progress of mitigation increases the attraction of an ‘overshoot and peak-
shaving’ scenario which combines temporary SRM with large-scale CDR
. Following the logicofdebt, the roleofCDRandSRM in this scenario is to compensate for
delayed mitigation, creating a double debt of CO2 emissions and global temperature
. Using the analogy of subprime lending, this strategy can be seen as oﬀering a
combination of subprime mortgage and open-ended ‘line-of-credit’
. Because the ‘success’ of peak-shaving by temporary SRM hinges critically on the
overshoot promise of large-scale CDR, SRMandCDR shouldnot bediscussed separately
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Introduction
In the wake of the 2015 Paris Agreement, the debate about the role of solar geoengineering (or solar radiation
management, SRM) and negative emissions (or carbon dioxide removal, CDR) is changing quickly, speciﬁcally
whether and how these technologies should be situated within a portfolio of climate policy responses.
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Before Paris, SRM and CDR were often grouped together under the common rubric ‘geoengineering’ (Royal
Society, 2009). But now, many experts agree that a clear separation between SRM and CDR is needed for sensible
science-policy discussions (Boucher et al., 2014; Lomax, Workman, Lenton, & Shah, 2015; Minx et al., 2018). While
SRM is still largely ignored in the mainstream debate (Parker & Geden, 2016), CDR is increasingly considered a
crucial policy option necessary to meet the Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting global temperature rise to well
below 2°C, or even 1.5°C, above the pre-industrial level (Gasser, Guivarch, Tachiiri, Jones, & Ciais, 2015; Minx
et al., 2018; Peters & Geden, 2017; Smith et al., 2016). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
Special Report on 1.5°C somewhat endorsed this position, where the risks and potentials of CDR were exten-
sively analysed across diﬀerent mitigation pathways, but SRM was kept oﬀ the table as a viable policy option
(IPCC, 2018).
However, the slow progress in global CO2 emissions reduction (with a rise in 2018; Le Quéré et al., 2018) is
increasing the likelihood of ‘overshoot’ scenarios in which warming temporarily exceeds the 1.5–2°C level,
before eventually returning to this target through reliance on large-scale deployment of CDR technologies
(Ricke, Millar, & MacMartin, 2017). This increased likelihood of temperature overshoot is changing the context
of debate, opening up the possibility of temporarily using SRM to avoid such overshoot—so-called ‘peak-
shaving’ (Sugiyama, Arino, Kosugi, Kurosawa, & Watanabe, 2018). It is indeed argued by some that SRM could
be used as a stop-gap measure as part of a holistic climate strategy to meet the Paris temperature target
(Long, 2017; MacMartin, Ricke, & Keith, 2018).
In this article, we argue that this emerging idea of temperature ‘overshoot and peak-shaving’ is not a secured
investment strategy for meeting the Paris target. Rather, it should better be understood as a high-risk specu-
lation, betting on the insecure promises of both solar geoengineering and negative emissions. We demonstrate
this using the logic of debt and the analogy of subprime mortgage lending.
Temperature ‘overshoot and peak-shaving’ scenario
The Paris Agreement has brought the feasibility and desirability of large-scale CDR deployment under the spot-
light (Anderson & Peters, 2016; Field & Mach, 2017; Lenzi, Lamb, Hilaire, Kowarsch, & Minx, 2018; Williamson,
2016). This is because nearly all the emissions scenarios in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report that are likely to
keep warming below 2°C require net negative CO2 emissions in the second half of this century. This
outcome is mostly achieved through the presumed extensive use of CDR technologies, such as bioenergy
with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) (Fuss et al., 2014). All the scenarios in the IPCC Special Report on
1.5°C presume the use of some form of CDR technology, even if not BECCS (IPCC, 2018; see also Holz, Siegel,
& Johnston, 2018; Obersteiner et al., 2018). It is now recognized that CDR is a necessity to meet, at a
minimum, the net-zero emissions target by compensating for ‘residual CO2 emissions’ that are near impossible
to mitigate (Gasser et al., 2015; Geden, Peters, & Scott, 2019; Rogelj et al., 2015).
These emissions scenarios are developed by integrated assessment models (IAMs) which are built around
ﬁnding policy pathways that enable long-term cost optimization, incorporating assumptions about technologi-
cal change, energy systems, population growth, etc. (Knutti & Rogelj, 2015). Such cost-optimal pathways deter-
mined in IAMs are strongly inﬂuenced by the choice of discount rate (Stanton, Ackerman, & Kartha, 2009). The
models usually apply a relatively high discount rate (van Vuuren, Hof, van Sluisveld, & Riahi, 2017), which in turn
places less weight on the future cost of BECCS than on the present cost of deep conventional mitigation (Ander-
son & Peters, 2016). Importantly, the inclusion of BECCS and other CDR technologies yields emissions scenarios
in which global temperature can temporarily exceed the threshold before falling back to the target level—so-
called ‘overshoot’ scenarios (Huntingford & Lowe, 2007)—a technically and economically feasible option. The
concept of overshoot is politically appealing because it can ease the burden of near-term mitigation, while
still keeping alive the promise of achieving long-term stabilization targets (Geden & Löschel, 2017).
However, temperature overshoot does nothing to defuse the inherent risks associated with increased
warming. Depending on the magnitude and duration of overshoot, these risks might include serious, irreversible
ecological and social changes (O’Neill et al., 2017; Ricke, Moreno-Cruz, Schewe, Levermann, & Caldeira, 2016).
Anxieties about such climate-driven risks could heighten the attraction of using SRM to avoid overshoot
because SRM technologies such as releasing sulphate aerosols into the stratosphere can in theory cool the
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Earth very quickly (Irvine, Kravitz, Lawrence, & Muri, 2016). Despite uncertainty over its adverse side-eﬀects, this
quick-cooling eﬀect of SRM makes it a potential means to reduce some of the serious impacts of climate change
(Keith, Parson, & Morgan, 2010), except non-climatic impacts such as ocean acidiﬁcation. In climate model simu-
lations, SRM is conceived as a temporary intervention to shave oﬀ the peak warming (‘peak-shaving’) caused by
excess emissions, so that global temperature can be kept approximately constant during the overshooting
period (MacMartin et al., 2018; Niemeier & Tilmes, 2017; Smith & Rasch, 2013; Sugiyama et al., 2018; Tilmes, San-
derson, & O’Neill, 2016).
Following Paris, if policymakers take the 1.5–2°C goal seriously, the concept of ‘overshoot and peak-shaving’
scenarios as a possible delivery strategy could attract more attention than ever before. Rogelj et al. (2016) esti-
mate that global temperature will likely rise to around 3°C or more by 2100 if the same level of mitigation eﬀorts
made under the Paris Agreement’s nationally determined contributions (NDCs) continues after 2030. While deep
emissions cuts before 2030 can avoid overshoot, and hence future reliance on large-scale CDR (IPCC, 2018), the
sluggish pace of reducing global CO2 emissions (UNEP, 2018) appears to make overshoot scenarios more likely.
Peak-shaving by temporary SRM might therefore be conceived as a necessary complement to keep warming
below 1.5–2°C (MacMartin et al., 2018; MacMartin & Kravitz, 2019; Parker & Geden, 2016). Following this reason-
ing, a combined deployment of temporary SRM and large-scale CDR may politically become more attractive.
The logic of debt – borrowing emissions and temperature
In overshoot and peak-shaving scenarios, SRM and CDR are in a mutually dependent strategic relationship—SRM
is used temporarily for controlling temperature before large-scale CDR can be realized, whereas CDR is deployed
as a longer-term exit strategy to reduce atmospheric CO2 concentration to the point where SRM is no longer
needed (Long & Shepherd, 2014). Because of this reciprocity, orchestrating SRM and CDR in combination
might sound like—to the ears of systems engineers—a ‘symphony for harmonized actions’ (Long, 2017).
However, rather than composing a symphony, their combination might alternatively commit the world to a
high-risk gamble (cf. Anderson & Peters, 2016; Shue, 2017).
To understand this gamble, the notion of debt is crucial. Insomuch as debt rests on a promise to pay back in
the future (Adkins, 2017), it weakens the responsibilities of the present. In overshoot and peak-shaving scenarios,
the role of SRM and CDR is to compensate for delayed mitigation. SRM buys time for mitigation (and CDR) by
oﬀsetting ongoing warming due to excess emissions (Keith & MacMartin, 2015; Wigley, 2006); CDR accommo-
dates slow rates of mitigation by promising that delays can be compensated later through net negative emis-
sions (Anderson & Peters, 2016; Meadowcroft, 2013). We can therefore read overshooting and peak-shaving
alike as acts of ‘borrowing’ or ‘creating debt’. Overshooting is borrowing carbon emissions (an ‘emissions
debt’ or ‘carbon debt’ (Carton, 2019; Geden, 2016)) to avoid near-term emissions reduction, a debt which is
to be paid back later by CDR. Peak-shaving is borrowing global temperature (a ‘temperature debt’ (Oschlies,
2018)) by deploying SRM to cancel warming above the target threshold until the point when no further borrow-
ing, of either sort, is needed. Either way, the world is placed in debt: whether emissions debt and/or temperature
debt (Figure 1).
Macdougall, Zickfeld, Knutti, and Matthews (2015) ﬁnd that, in their climate model simulations, ‘overshoot
net carbon budget’ (i.e. net cumulative CO2 emissions following exceedance of and return to a warming
target) is smaller than the conventional carbon budget consistent with achieving a warming target without
overshoot.1 In other words, if cumulative emissions exceed a particular warming target, restoring that
warming target requires that more carbon will need eventually to be removed from the atmosphere than
the actual amount by which the original carbon budget was exceeded (Macdougall et al., 2015; Zickfeld, Mac-
dougall, & Matthews, 2016). This means that CDR has to pay back the emissions debt with ‘interest’, i.e. the diﬀer-
ence between net-overshoot and conventional carbon budgets, where the size of the interest payment depends
on the magnitude of overshoot.
In overshoot and peak-shaving scenarios, the role of CDR is to repay a debt. In contrast, SRM acts only to
create a debt—this is why SRM is by itself ‘imperfect’ (Keith et al., 2010). Temperature debt is created by the
temporary masking of warming by SRM. This debt can only be written-oﬀ when CDR eventually succeeds in
paying oﬀ the emissions debt. In this sense, peak-shaving can be seen as a form of ‘debt ﬁnancing’ or
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‘ﬁnancial leverage’ that uses the temperature debt to facilitate ‘investment’ in masking the excess warming. This
‘investment’ keeps the global temperature constant. If successful, such leveraging can generate a great return,
namely the write-oﬀ of the temperature debt. However, if the emissions debt is not paid back, the temperature
debt will have to be extended indeﬁnitely for continuing leveraged investment in warming-oﬀset above the
target temperature. Or else, the debtor will be forced to ﬁle for ‘bankruptcy’, i.e. a sudden termination of
SRM with the associated dangerous spike in warming (Matthews & Caldeira, 2007). The sudden failure of
such leveraged investment would then result in exceptionally severe losses and damage that otherwise
would not have occurred (Jones et al., 2013; McCusker, Armour, Bitz, & Battisti, 2014).
The analogy with subprime mortgage lending
The nature of indebtedness accompanied by overshoot and peak-shaving scenarios—and the interdependence
between SRM and CDR—can be illustrated further by using the analogy of subprime mortgage lending. We ana-
logize CO2 emissions and global temperature to a ‘mortgage’ and a ‘home equity’ respectively—future
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of carbon dioxide emissions and global mean temperature change up to 2100. (a) Emissions debt results from the
near-term excess of emissions in the overshoot compared to the non-overshoot scenario. (b) Temperature debt results from the temporary
masking of warming committed by excess emissions and which is over and above the target temperature. All curves are merely illustrative.
Figure 2. Analogical illustration of temperature overshoot and peak-shaving scenarios with mortgage and home equity. (a) Diﬀerent ‘mortgage
repayment’ schedules for overshoot and non-overshot scenarios (corresponding to CO2 emissions pathway with a relative diﬀerence from current
pathway as a baseline case). (b) Diﬀerent approaches to managing ‘home equity’ of global temperature (corresponding to temperature pathway
with a relative change from the 2020 levels). The categorization of six approaches (business-as-usual, mitigation, CDR, SRM, adaptation, impacts
and suﬀering) is based on Long and Shepherd (2014).
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emissions reduction equates to the mortgage repayment, while a temperature increase equates to a decline in
home equity (see Figure 2).
Imagine that you plan to buy a new house and promise your child inheritors that you will maintain its value as
best you can for their beneﬁt. However, being short of savings, you secure a mortgage from the bank and
promise to pay it back by the date of inheritance transfer. The bank then securitizes your mortgage and sells
it as a mortgage-backed security to your children who become the ultimate lenders of your mortgage loan.
Nevertheless, you remain ﬁnancially constrained and so not only are repayments delayed, but you also
under-maintain the house so its value diminishes. You therefore leverage additional funds (second-lien
loans2) from the bank to retain your house’s equity value under these delayed mortgage repayment conditions.
In this deal on second lien, the bank makes a special arrangement so that if you duly completed your mortgage
repayment and there were no outstanding ﬁrst-mortgage loans by the due date, the leveraged second-lien loans
could bewritten-oﬀ. This deal is made possible only when house price desired by the child investors is realized at
the date of inheritance transfer.
Here, we can read the Paris Agreement as the imaginary contract of transferring a house between parents
and children at the agreed house price (i.e. 1.5–2°C). To secure this contract, the bank may arrange diﬀerent
mortgage lending schemes (i.e. emissions scenarios) for prime or subprime borrowers, depending on their
credit scores. Importantly, since the bank securitizes the mortgage and then sells it to the child investors, chil-
dren play a dual role both as mortgage lenders and as heirs to the house. (For a schematic illustration of our
analogy with mortgage lending and securitization, see Figure 3.)
The diﬀerent emissions pathways between overshoot and non-overshoot scenarios indicate diﬀerences to the
loan scheme and the repayment schedule (Figure 2(a)). Non-overshoot scenarios are somewhat similar to prime
loan lending. Here, debtors are obligated to repay aggressively in the short term, but the rate of repayment is
largelyﬂat in the long run so that planned repayment canbe assured. In contrast, overshoot scenarios are the adjus-
table-rate loan for subprime borrowers. Because the borrower’s current income level is not high enough, they are
allowed low-rate or minimum repayments for a little while, but are then expected to repay later with a far higher
rate facilitated by assumed income growth. As we analogize emissions reductions tomortgage repayments, cross-
ing the line into the ‘net negative emissions’ (or ‘emissions below zero’) territory can be interpreted as making an
‘interest payment’ on top of the ‘principal repayment’. Here, the size of net-negative emissions can be seen as the
‘interest’ on the loan.3 As subprime loans come with much higher interest payments than do prime loans, over-
shoot scenarios require a larger volumeof net negativeemissions thandonon-overshoot scenarios.4We likenover-
shoot scenarios to subprime loans because their repayment depends crucially on the unproven promise of large-
scale CDR deployment (Anderson & Peters, 2016; Field &Mach, 2017; Fuss et al., 2014; Lenzi et al., 2018;Williamson,
2016). Large-scale CDR has no assurance of solvency, so its credit rating must be scored accordingly.
Figure 3. Simple schematic diagram of mortgage lending and securitization. During the process, ﬁnancial intermediaries such as banks play an
important role as mortgage originators and/or security underwriters. Investors in mortgage-backed security (MBS) become the ultimate lenders
of mortgage loans. In the real ﬁnancial market, investors would often decide which mortgage bonds to buy, based on the information provided
by credit rating agencies.
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Meanwhile, the resulting temperature pathways suggest diﬀerent approaches to managing home equity
(Figure 2(b)). For example, if no mitigation actions are taken (the ‘business-as-usual’ case), the house value
will greatly diminish. In contrast, rapid and deep mitigation can prevent such a sharp decline in value, although
some degree of depreciation is unavoidable as temperature rises to at least 1.5–2°C. In this respect, peak-shaving
by temporary SRM is borrowing a ‘home-equity-line-of-credit’ (HELOC) as a form of leverage for house renova-
tion so that the house value can be retained. Since HELOCs allow borrowers to withdraw funds as they need at
any time during the draw period (up to the credit limit), temporary SRM can conveniently be used to adjust the
amount of cooling through changing net radiative forcing (see Keith & MacMartin, 2015). Furthermore, HELOCs
tend to have a small payment requirement during the draw period; the cost of SRM deployment is likewise
cheap (Smith & Wagner, 2018). The key diﬀerence between HELOC and ‘SRM-line-of-credit’ (SRM-LOC) is that
HELOCs must be repaid after the draw period ends, whereas there is no repayment period for SRM-LOCs.
SRM-LOCs cannot be repaid on their own terms, but only written-oﬀ when the ‘emissions-mortgage’ has
been paid oﬀ by simultaneous CDR. If these emissions ‘repayments’ become delinquent then the SRM ‘credit
line’ needs to be extended accordingly. Because lenders are also inheritors, and rely on that inheritance,
lenders have no option of foreclosure, but instead must extend the term and keep leveraging—otherwise,
the result would be a collapse in the value of the house (i.e. a sudden termination of SRM), which would
heavily damage a property that they are supposed to inherit (Jones et al., 2013; McCusker et al., 2014).
Drawing the above arguments together we suggest that, by analogy, temperature overshoot and peak-
shaving is based on a combination of a subprime mortgage (i.e. an emissions debt) and a HELOC (i.e. a temp-
erature debt). With this analogy, some important lessons can be drawn from the US subprime mortgage crisis in
2007–2009.5 One of them is that the opaquely structured mortgage securities were far too complex for investors
to know the true riskiness of the underlying subprime mortgages (Gorton, 2009; Purnanandam, 2011). Substan-
tial ratings inﬂation by credit rating agencies (Bolton, Freixas, & Shapiro, 2012; White, 2010) and widespread
mortgage fraud by loan originators and security underwriters (Griﬃn & Maturana, 2016; Piskorski, Seru, &
Witkin, 2015) were tragically responsible for obscuring their default risks, a situation conducive to creating sub-
prime credit boom. As such, misreporting the default risk or inﬂating the credit rating of ‘overshoot’ scenarios is
—intentionally or not—a precipitous step towards creating an analogous risk of a climate debt crisis.
Furthermore, the US subprime mortgage crisis was aggravated by excessive leverage through home-equity
borrowings, such as HELOCs (Khandani, Lo, & Merton, 2013; Mian & Suﬁ, 2011). The risk of such aggressive lever-
age was unnoticed during periods of rising house prices. When house prices fell, however, because homeowners
could not easily ‘deleverage’, the rate of loan defaults signiﬁcantly increased. In the case of climate change,
insofar as global temperature is kept constant regardless of the ability to reduce CO2 emissions, peak-
shaving obscures the progress of emissions reductions, i.e. whether mortgage repayments are being met as
planned or else being signiﬁcantly delayed. This means that, by maintaining house prices, leverage via tempor-
ary SRMmasks the risk of major default by subprime borrowers, that is, non-deployment of large-scale CDR tech-
nologies (cf. Demyanyk & van Hemert, 2011). As a consequence, far from complementing mitigation, SRM may
actually risk further delaying serious mitigation (cf. McLaren, 2016), that is, sinking deeper into climate debt. Cru-
cially, temporary SRM is impossible to be deleveraged gradually unless large-scale CDR were rolled out very
swiftly and signiﬁcant progress in conventional mitigation were made. Thus, the combined use of temporary
SRM and large-scale CDR (i.e. aggressive household leverage with subprime mortgage) may very well cause a
similar risk of systemic failure, putting the world on the verge of a hidden climate debt crisis.
Conclusion
To meet the Paris climate goal, the idea of an ‘overshoot and peak-shaving’ scenario is emerging. The logic of
debt (Adkins, 2017) helps to deepen understanding of this scenario, which uses CDR and SRM as a temporary
strategy to compensate for delayed mitigation. Overshooting is borrowing emissions from the future to defer
mitigation in the present by promising to pay oﬀ later through large-scale CDR; peak-shaving is borrowing
temperature through temporary SRM to mask—but not erase—the warming from excess emissions, thereby
buying time for mitigation and CDR. Paying oﬀ the debt of delayed mitigation will eventually translate into
the social and ecological costs of deploying large-scale CDR technologies (Field & Mach, 2017; Williamson,
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2016). This can be considered unjust and unsustainable for future generations because it might seriously harm
eﬀorts to meet their own human needs by increasing the risks of hunger, biodiversity loss and water stress
(Dooley & Kartha, 2018; Shue, 2017).
Furthermore, the analogy with subprime loans signals to us that, because of the mutually dependent stra-
tegic relationship between the two ‘geoengineering’ technologies in overshoot and peak-shaving scenarios,
SRM and CDR should not be discussed separately. The eﬃcacy of temporary SRM cannot be evaluated in iso-
lation of the feasibility of large-scale CDR. When the concept of temporary SRM is proposed by its advocates,
it sounds like a modest and plausible idea (Keith & MacMartin, 2015). However, the ‘success’ of temporary
SRM hinges critically on the promise of massively scaling-up CDR within reasonably short periods of time.
Any failure of this overshoot promise would necessitate prolonged—potentially endless—peak-shaving.
SRM would then become not a temporary but a permanent ‘line of credit’. The risk of incessant SRM (i.e.
obscuring an ever-rising climate debt), together with the risk of unplanned termination (Parker & Irvine,
2018), must therefore be fully assessed and communicated before its deployment is considered seriously.
In our view, framing SRM as temporary usage by counting on the unproven promise of large-scale CDR is
reckless because it is by deﬁnition a means of debt ﬁnancing. Crucially, SRM cannot be deleveraged on its
own.
Some may argue that the strategy of temperature overshoot and peak-shaving can oﬀer a safe passage away
from dangerous climate change (see Steﬀen et al., 2018). However, given the unreliable promise of debt repay-
ments, it is unwise and irresponsible to present this speculative scenario as a secured feasible investment strat-
egy for the world. We have already seen the real-world consequences of poor decision-making in respect of the
US subprime mortgage crisis. Such a strategy might help manage some of the risks associated with future
climate change, just as borrowing helps people to buy a house or to maintain its value. But it may also very
likely place the world in a situation of escalating ‘climate debt’. The failure to communicate properly the riskiness
of an overshoot and peak-shaving strategy is the dangerous ﬁrst step towards being trapped in this potential
climate debt crisis, as happened in the failure to appropriately rate the riskiness of subprime mortgage bonds in
the run-up to the US housing market crisis. Overshoot and peak-shaving scenarios should be seen as gambling
future sustainability against a set of insecure promises.
Notes
1. This diﬀerence in the size of carbon budgets is caused by the lagged response of temperature to CO2 decline during the tran-
sition from positive emissions to negative emissions, which is mainly due to ocean thermal inertia (Macdougall et al., 2015).
2. Lien is the legal right that a creditor can have a claim to seize the debtor’s collateral property when a debtor fails to meet the
obligations of a loan. A home-equity loan or line-of-credit is often considered a ‘second mortgage’ or ‘second-lien loan’ using
home as a collateral, a debt that places its holders second in line to be repaid in the case of default.
3. Note that the interest on ‘mortgage loans’ deﬁned here is not the same as the interest associated with the ‘emissions debt’
discussed previously. This is because the deﬁnition of ‘principal’ in each case is diﬀerent. For emissions debt, the principal
is the ‘excess emissions over the target’s carbon budget’. For ‘mortgage loans’, since we use the current pathway as our base-
line case (see Figure 2(a)), the principal is the ‘cumulative net-positive emissions gap with current pathway’. The diﬀerence in
the total mortgage repayments (including the loan interest) between the overshoot and non-overshoot scenarios is then equal
to the amount of the interest on the emissions debt, i.e. the diﬀerence between the net-overshoot and conventional carbon
budgets.
4. There are always ‘residual non-CO2 emissions’ from some greenhouse gas sources (e.g. CH4, N2O), which require to some
degree net-negative CO2 emissions to compensate for non-CO2 forcing and stabilize temperature, even in non-overshoot scen-
arios (Rogelj et al., 2015; Holz et al., 2018; Obersteiner et al., 2018).
5. Of course, the reasons why the subprime mortgage crisis in the US housing market triggered the global ﬁnancial crisis are
rather more complex (see, for example, Acharya & Richardson, 2009; Gorton, 2009). Note that our analogy is not intended
to capture the full picture of either crisis.
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